Call for Chapters: Game Theoretic Analysis of Congestion, Safety and Security

Proposals for contributions considering the interactions between congestion and safety/security are due to the book editors by June 15, 2013, with full papers due December 1. 

From the book editors:

We are editing a book for Springer with a tentative title “Game Theoretic Analysis of Congestion, Safety and Security.” Many researchers working on congestion have not extensively considered safety/security, and vice versa. However, significant interactions exist between the two research areas, which motivated this book. We envision the book to establish a new and enhanced current state of affairs within this topic, illustrate linkages between research approaches, and lay the foundation for subsequent research. Congestion (excessive crowding) is defined broadly to include all kinds of flows; e.g., road/sea/air traffic, people, data, information, water, electricity, and organisms. We consider a system where congestion occurs, or a system which may be in parallel, series, interlinked, or interdependent, with flows one way or both ways. Congestion models exist in abundance. The book makes ground by introducing game theory and safety/security. For the analysis to be game theoretic, at least two players must be present. For example, in Wang and Zhuang (2011) one approver and a population of normal and adversary travelers are considered. Similarly, in Bier and Hausken (2013), one defender and one attacker are considered, in addition to drivers who choose the more time-efficient of two arcs of different lengths. Multiple players can be adversaries with different concerns regarding system reliability; e.g., one or several terrorists, a government, various local or regional government agencies, companies, or others with stakes for or against system reliability. Governments, companies and authorities may have tools to handle congestion, as well as ensure safety/security against various threats. The players may have a variety of individual concerns which may or may not be consistent with system safety or security. Much of the congestion literature is not game-theoretic, and does not extensively consider safety or security. Also, most game-theoretic analysis do not account for congestion. If you would like to contribute a chapter to this book, please let us know as soon as possible to the emails below. The chapter should be 12pt, double spaced, 30 pages or less. You are also welcome to forward this invitation to your colleagues who might be interested in this, or you may suggest potential authors to us. All the book chapters will be double-blinded peer-reviewed according to conventional standards. 

The time schedule is as follows:

June 15, 2013: Title, authors, and 200 words abstract due

June 30, 2013 or earlier: Decision on abstracts

December 1, 2013: Full paper due

February 15, 2014 or earlier: Distribution of referee reports

April 30, 2014: Revised paper due (if needed)

May 31, 2014: Delivery of manuscript to Springer

Please feel free to let us know if you have any questions or comments.

Yours sincerely,

Kjell Hausken

Faculty of Sciences, University of Stavanger

kjell.hausken@uis.no

Jun Zhuang

Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering, University at Buffalo, SUNY

jzhuang@buffalo.edu

References

- Bier, V. and Hausken, K. (2013). Defending and Attacking Networks Subject to Traffic Congestion. Reliability Engineering & System Safety 112, 214-224.

- Wang, X. and Zhuang, J. (2011). Balancing Congestion and Security in the Presence of Strategic Applicants with Private Information," European Journal of Operational Research 212, 1, 100-111.

Share