



California State University
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Enhancing Cybersecurity: Systematic Investigation of Insider Threats Utilizing the AcciMap Framework



Cyber Safe

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AGENDA

- Introduction
- Methodology
- AcciMap Development & Analysis
- Recommendations
- Conclusion

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INTRODUCTION

The Insider and Outsider Threat



INTRODUCTION



Insider Threat

Outsider Threat



STATISTICS

From 2018 up-to-date

2018...2019...
2020?



The overall cost of insider threats has increased from \$8.76M to \$11.45M
31% Increase



The number of incidents has increased from 3,200 to 4,700 incidents
47% Increase



The average cost of an incident investigation increased from \$75,215 to \$103,798
38% Increase



STATISTICS



5%

NON EXSISTENT

of the organizations have no mature security capabilities that monitor insider threats



16%

PREDICTIVE

of the organizations establish appropriate levels of monitoring to all employees



24%

REACTIVE

of the organizations have no prediction programs for insider threats



7%

OPTIMIZED

of the organizations have a mature view of insider threat risk



48%

PROACTIVE

of the organizations monitor employees with potential malicious behaviors

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
METHODOLOGY

Rasmussen's Risk Management
Framework and The AcciMap





RISK MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK

- The foundation of the proposed methodology is based on a dynamic risk management framework originally developed by Rasmussen.
- The framework is underpinned by the idea that various levels can interact with one another shaping culture, behavior, safety and possibly threats.





RASMUSSEN'S ACCIMAP



 = Failures, decisions, actions, etc.

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ACCIMAP ANALYSIS

Contributing Causes, Findings and
Observations



DEVELOPED ACCIMAP TO INVESTIGATE INSIDER THREATS

Government Laws and Regulations

Cybercrime Prosecution Failure

Organizations disclose breaches and handle them internally with no legal action due to concerns about their reputation and negative publicity [2]

The decision regarding reporting a cybercrime is mainly based on economic factors (EMV) [27]

Lack of key litigation in the computer fraud and abuse act (CFAA) if the employee misuses information to which he had access [12, 28]

The use of VPNs and SSL allows hackers to operate with a certain degree of anonymity [2]

Federal Laws Limitations [28]

Lack of information sharing engagement between organizations due to the concern of implicating the antitrust laws under FOIA [28, 33]

Nonfederal entities are discouraged to share sensitive cybersecurity information with the government due to lack of specific enough laws to protect particular types of records from being released to the public under FOIA

Lack of secure, continuous, automated monitoring of IT systems rather than the current FISMA's ineffective checklist exercise [28, 33]

Lack of proper clarification, in the context of the cybersecurity for 1974 Privacy Act, for personal identification information and how it can be used

Lack of means to certify and evaluate private companies' compliance with the federal role in order to protect Critical Infrastructure (CI)

Insufficient means to enforce the FISMA compliance within and across organizations.

The state and local law enforcement agencies do not invest sufficient resources for enforcement of activities towards cybercrime [28]

Government Investments [33]

Lack of awareness campaigns to promote proper cybersecurity hygiene that address cybersecurity risks and best practices

Lack of certain codes of conduct that provide best practices for Internet Service Providers to apply consistently to their customers

Members of the congress are not well equipped to help educate businesses and individuals about cybersecurity hygiene



DEVELOPED ACCIMAP TO INVESTIGATE INSIDER THREATS-CONT'D

Company	Organizational Ethical Climate	Security Policies and Procedures	Cybersecurity Standards Compliance	Outsourcing Policies and Procedures	Employees Social Networking Guidelines	Cybersecurity Infrastructure
	Cultural changes and ethical behaviors between employees are not addressed explicitly [3]	Negligence of ethnographic methods to improve the understanding of differing cultural norms [25]	Failure to comply with the National Institute of Science and Technology basic cybersecurity standards [16, 29]	Unsupervised granted logical and physical access over outsourced IT services [2]	Unrestricted policy regarding the use of social networking applications [3]	Lack of mature security programs that can identify and monitor potential insider threats [5]
	Lack of clear ethical standards and rules similar to the code of ethics provided by the Information Systems Security Association (ISSA) [30]	Lack of clear policy languages to understand the systems' operations and different policies [20]	Failure to implement security standards and practices when that investment does not directly benefit the company [11, 14]	The reliance on online storage systems to exchange and store sensitive information [6]	Poor implementation of BYOD policy without deploying mobile device management [13]	Poor cybersecurity practices that largely reflect defensive tools aimed at outside attacks [3, 5]
	Lack of confidentiality agreement prohibiting the disclosure of any information that is contrary to the interests of the employer [12]	Failure to establish procedures to facilitate rapid resolution of security questions [34]	Failure to implement basic principles to ensure that the created internal standards are clear and relevant [29]	Failure to instruct third parties with strong multifactor authentication (MFA) [14]	Unrestricted policy regarding the encryption of sensitive information in emails [17]	Security networks focuses entirely on the human insider while neglecting technological threat [13]
		Lack of policies addressing user permitted access and public-facing terms of service [12]	Failure to link some standards to policy so it ensures consistent implementation [29]	Negligence of a comprehensive and accurate list of IT assets inventory [16]	Lack of control over unauthorized devices from connecting to the company's network [13]	



DEVELOPED ACCIMAP TO INVESTIGATE INSIDER THREATS-CONT'D

Supervisory and Management

Management Ethical Considerations

- Lack of privacy rights which ensure that employees do not suffer unwanted intrusions [11]
- Workplace abuse and internal control from senior positions [2, 3]
- Failure to encourage reporting of any insiders' intentions, plans, and/or ongoing activities [21]
- Domination of egoistic ethical climate between managers and employees [7]

Technical Training and Education

- Lack of recurring technical trainings to refresh and maintain employee user knowledge [25]
- Poor cybersecurity habits that makes employees less motivated to actually implement them [8]
- Developing security trainings while neglecting the psychological aspects of some exploits [23]
- Lack of exposure to anti-phishing education and other social engineering campaigns [11, 14, 19]
- Lack of training regarding the use of portable and removal media devices [3, 4, 18]

Non-technical Education and Training

- Lack of situational awareness trainings which facilitate positive resilience characteristics [32]
- Lack of training that ensure that the integrity of security is maintained effectively at all times [34]
- Lack of training that help identify high risk behavioral symptoms and applying other similar observational skills [34]
- Lack of task management trainings that provide effective workload for critical tasks [32]

Tasks Assignment and Management

- Assigning unqualified personnel to tasks leading to usage errors and serious consequences [23]
- Failure to manage and control the access credentials to specific electronic resources [2, 20]
- Incorrectly assigning large workloads to employees leading to adverse performance [11]
- Lack of balance between operational goals and security goals [23]
- Failure to discontinue system access to employees who have been terminated to impede activity motivated by revenge [21]

Cybersecurity Standards Implementation

- Failure to timely remediate cyber vulnerabilities and properly apply security patches [16, 19]
- Poor penetration testing that could assess the robustness of firewalls and security features [30]
- Implementing security policies that interfere with the employees workflow and not support it [20]
- Lack of vigilance and security alerts against the unwitting insider [13]



DEVELOPED ACCIMAP TO INVESTIGATE INSIDER THREATS-CONT'D

Staff

Ethical Behavior and Issues

IP Theft as a result of project attachment as if it belongs to them [2]

IT Sabotage as a result of pressure or stress from management or colleagues [2, 3]

Unwittingly leaking information or giving access and control to adversary over targeted assets [3]

IT Fraud due to influence of competitors or other parties to achieve personal/financial gain [2, 14]

Security Practice Negligence

Operating open DNS resolvers causing distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks [15]

Lack of attention for design inconsistencies between real and fake error messages [19, 23, 24]

Failure to notice the absence of security indicators when they should be present [11, 26]

Software updates are not applied to all devices, leaving gaps in the network's protection [17]

Work Pressure and Management

Responding to phishing emails due to the presence of large work and email loads [11]

The use of software without the review and approval of the organization (Shadow IT) [9, 8]

Tendency to ignore the organization's warning notices against phishing attempts [23]

Security System Obstacles

The company's security policies and procedures are considered incomplete or poorly defined [2]

Employing shortcuts around difficult inconvenient security system processes [23]

Lack of knowledge and use of padlock icon and HTTPS [26]

Situational Awareness and Training

Lack of situational awareness of potential risks involved in clicking fake popups [24]

Failure to recognize security measures installed in spoofed websites and web browsers [13, 26]

Little training to visual deception that mimic legitimate text, images and windows [26]



DEVELOPED ACCIMAP TO INVESTIGATE INSIDER THREATS-CONT'D

Technology & Physical Events, Processes and Conditions

Software Exploits and Vulnerabilities

Occurrence of buffer overflow corrupting or overwriting the valid data held in the system [19]

Exploiting software vulnerabilities caused by software bugs and design flaws [19]

Lack of continuous update to the system's curated blacklist that is persistently out of data [31]

Incorrect data validation leading to data corruption such as SQL injection [19]

Technical and Design Flaws

The use of old wireless networks which rely on weak and less secure WEP encryption [14]

Lack of security property library that can protect IP cores against hardware trojans [37]

Insider threat detection system classified normal activities as outliers [22]

Designing computer-based algorithms focused on reliability without proper immunity to adversarial AI attacks [13]

Hardware Exploits and Vulnerabilities

Adding a hardware Trojan that might cause an error detection to accept inputs that should be rejected [17]

Exploiting weaknesses in the cryptographic system hardware such as power consumption [36]

The use of untrusted hardware which in turn may contain harmful hardware-based Trojans (illegal clones) [19]

Operating Procedures and Conditions


Lack of effective monitoring and routine check for security standards compliance [29]

Failure to prevent unauthorized devices or allowing its access up to 90 seconds [16, 17]

Lack of mobile device management to promote user security awareness and poor safety hygiene [13]

Implementing legacy systems or applications that are no longer supported by vendors and difficult to secure [16]


DEVELOPED ACCIMAP TO INVESTIGATE INSIDER THREATS





ACCIMAP ANALYSIS

- Among internal-to-an-organization influencing factors, the company layer was found to be the root cause of questionable decisions made by management and personnel which contributed to insider threat.
- Among external-to-an-organization influencing factors, the layer of Government and Regulators was found to be crucial to security implementations in an organization since it mainly depends on the prosecution of laws, rules and regulations.



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RECOMMENDATIONS

Promoting Security Culture



SECURITY CULTURE

ROLE OF ORGANIZATION

- The organization must allocate sufficient financial, technical and human resources to implement the assigned security responsibilities.
- The organizations must make arrangements for the regular review of their security practices and systems.
- The organization should coordinate with similar organizations to communicate security related information.
- A policy document is needed which states the commitment of the organization to security culture.



SECURITY CULTURE

ROLE OF MANAGEMENT

- Managers are responsible for initiating practices that comply with the organization's security policies and objectives.
- Conduct self-assessments and arrange for independent audits of the management systems.
- Managers must ensure that training is conducted to develop skills and provide tools to promote and implement security culture.
- Managers need to encourage personnel to report any event that could affect the organization's security culture.

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CONCLUSION

Enhancing Proactive Capabilities



CONCLUSION

- The analysis of past insider threat incidents indicates that they were not caused by the “coincidence of independent failures and human errors”, rather through the interactions of multiple involved contributing causes.
- There is a need to see and analyze the actions of workers or the errors that triggered an accident in a broader socio-technical context.
- The developed AcciMap provides a systemic view of accident causation that extends beyond the immediate causes. Rather it uncovers the aggregated factors throughout the system that promoted the conditions for the threat.

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Thank You

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